This study integrates research on strategic alliances and security analysts by focusing on the extent to which alliance announcements affect the amount of coverage firms obtain from security analysts. Adopting the perspective that alliance announcements constitute important market signals, I argue that they increase analyst coverage at a decreasing rate, but also that the strength of the relationship between announcements and coverage depends on the density of alliances. The relationship is strongest when alliance density is low because more attractive alliance partners are available, or when alliance density is high because more attractive resources are available in the alliance network. I find support for these arguments in the empirical context of alliance announcements among computer technology firms and discuss their consequences for research on alliance-based market signals.
importance of analyst coverage to firms and investors, it is not surprising that considerable research has focused on the determinants of analyst coverage.
Most research agrees that analysts are more likely to cover firms if they have favorable expectations about their future performance and the benefits of coverage exceed the costs of coverage (Bhushan, 1989; McNichols and O'Brien, 1997) . Analysts prefer not to cover poorly performing firms because unfavorable coverage could jeopardize future investment banking business, make management less willing to provide information, and reduce trading commissions from investors (McNichols and O'Brien, 1997) . Analysts also prefer stability in the portfolio of firms they cover because they invest considerable resources in gaining accuracy in forecasting the earnings of the firms they cover and are punished for inaccurate earnings forecasts by being more likely to lose their jobs (Mikhail et al., 1997 (Mikhail et al., , 1999 . Early research suggested that analysts base their coverage decisions on economic firm attributes predicting future performance, such as firm size, financial performance, and growth rate (Bhushan, 1989) . More recent research suggests the difficulty of predicting future performance and the importance of making the right coverage decisions also makes analysts seek external validation of their coverage decisions among other analysts (Rao et al., 2001 ). This study suggests that analysts not only seek external validation of their coverage decisions among their peers but also seek external validation by paying attention to the degree to which firms are in demand as alliance partners.
Investors have been shown to attend to alliance announcements and in general react positively to them (McConnell and Nantell, 1985; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993) . I suggest security analysts also attend to alliance announcements and that these announcements affect analysts' coverage decisions. Alliance announcements may function as market signals because they are observable events, management exerts some control over alliance formation, and the propensity to form alliances is inversely related to the amount and quality of the resources and capabilities firms possess (Spence, 1974) . I argue that analysts prefer to cover firms that are in high demand as alliance partners and therefore announce more alliances than firms that are in low demand as alliance partners. By focusing on alliance announcements, analysts get a sense of the degree to which other firms have validated the resources and capabilities of the focal firms (Stuart et al., 1999) . They also expand their focus from resources possessed by firms to include network resources that tend to increase future firm performance and therefore in themselves constitute important resources (Gulati, 1999) .
Alliance announcements are, however, not always equally effective as market signals. The effectiveness of alliance announcements as market signals depends on the strength of the relationship between alliance participation and future performance, and I suggest that the density of alliances or the number of prior announced alliances is an important factor in this relationship. The relationship between alliance announcements and future performance is strongest when alliance density is low because more attractive alliance opportunities are available and when alliance density is high because more attractive resources are then available in the alliance network. I present a comprehensive set of arguments that show why competitive and institutional processes make alliance density important for the relationship between alliance announcements and analyst coverage, before testing the hypotheses in the empirical context of alliance announcements among computer technology firms.
Theory and hypotheses

Strategic alliances as market signals
Since security analysts have strong incentives to focus coverage on firms that will perform well in the future, their coverage decisions are primarily focused on identifying this subset of firms (McNichols and O'Brien, 1997) . This task is inherently difficult. Firm performance is determined in complex interactions between the resources and capabilities firms possess and the aggregate structure of the market in which they compete (Rumelt, 1991; Porter, 1997, 2003) . However, resources and capabilities are typically unobservable to outsiders and their relationship to future performance is highly ambiguous (Barney, 1991) , and market structures have become more dynamic as technology and competition continually reshape them (D'Aveni, 1994) . Although resources, capabilities, and market structures continue to be important factors in coverage decisions, strategic alliances represent a complementary approach to identify firms that are expected to perform well in the future. Alliances provide external validation of coverage decisions because firms that participate in the same markets are likely experts on the resources and capabilities possessed by other firms, and firms are unlikely to form alliances with other firms whose resources and capabilities they believe to be worthless.
In addition to representing an endorsement of firms' current resources and capabilities, strategic alliances also help firms gain access to resources and capabilities possessed by other firms. Alliances tend to have positive performance consequences because they provide a mechanism for firms to share and develop economic resources, such as capital, technologies, and patents Stuart, 2000) , and institutional resources, such as status and legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 1992; Stuart et al., 1999) . For example, research has shown that alliances tend to increase survival rates (Baum and Oliver, 1992; Mitchell and Singh, 1996) , innovation and growth rates (Ahuja, 2000; Stuart, 2000) , and financial performance (Powell et al., 1999) . Since alliances provide a mechanism for firms to share and develop their resources and capabilities, analysts may not only look to alliances for valuation of firms' current resources and capabilities but also expect that alliances will actually increase the value of these resources and capabilities over time. Analysts are, in other words, well advised to consider alliances in their coverage decision, and the observation that investment houses often evaluate biotech firms on the basis of their alliances (Powell, 1996: 206) is therefore not surprising.
If the number of alliance announcements reflects the degree to which firms' resources and capabilities are in demand by other firms, or if firms that are central in alliance networks because they form many alliances perform better than otherwise similar firms, then analysts should use information about the number of alliances firms participate in rather than whether they participate in alliances or not. Most research suggests that firms with more and better resources and capabilities are indeed in higher demand as alliance partners and therefore form more alliances than other firms. Gulati (1999) reported that larger manufacturing firms with more experience in alliances were more likely to form alliances than smaller firms with less experience. Most research also suggests that centrality not only reflects the amount and quality of the resources and capabilities firms currently possess but also increases the likelihood firms will perform even better in the future. Powell et al. (1999) suggested that central firms perform better than peripheral firms because network centrality facilitates resource accumulation. They reported that central biotechnology firms obtained more patents, brought in more non-operating income, grew more rapidly in size, and generated greater sales revenues than did peripheral firms. Stuart (2000) reported similarly that semiconductor firms that participated in more alliances with large and innovative firms had higher growth and innovation rates than other firms because they had access to more resources.
It is nevertheless unlikely that each additional alliance announcement is equally important. Although announcing 10 alliances in a year may provide an overall stronger market signal than announcing one alliance, it is unlikely that the tenth alliance is as important as the first alliance. When a firm already has achieved some degree of external endorsement from other firms, each additional endorsement provides less and less new information about the firm. Similarly, since the economic value of alliances varies and firms are most likely to enter the most valuable first (this argument is further developed below), the tenth alliance is most likely less valuable than the first alliance even though it may still add value to the firm. These arguments suggest that the effect of alliance announcements on analyst coverage is likely to increase at a decreasing rate.
Security analysts seeking to identify firms that will perform well in the future should therefore pay attention to strategic alliances and be more willing to cover firms that are more in demand as alliance partners and therefore announce more alliances. The resources and capabilities of alliance-active firms have implicitly been endorsed by their alliance partners and they can, in turn, use their central position in alliance networks to further increase the value of their resources and capabilities. The following hypothesis is suggested on this basis:
Alliance announcements increase analyst coverage at a decreasing rate.
Alliance density as a moderator of signaling effectiveness
The effectiveness of alliance announcements as market signals depends on the strength of the relationship between alliance announcements and future performance, which, in turn, depends on the availability of attractive alliance partners and the amount of resources available in the alliance network. Since each firm has a limited capacity to participate in alliances, the availability of alliance partners within a given industry and the availability of resources in the alliance network will depend on the density or number of alliances that have already been formed within that industry. The density of alliances within an industry is an important moderator of the effectiveness of alliance announcements as market signals. Alliance announcements are expected to be most effective when alliance density is low because more attractive alliance partners are available, or when alliance density is high because it ensures that more resources are available in the alliance network. The lower the alliance density within a given industry, the more likely a particular firm is to find attractive alliance partners that have not already exhausted their alliance capacities. Alliances are the outcomes of a selection process in which firms seek partners that best fit their alliance needs from a limited pool of attractive partners with limited alliance capacities. Alliances are, however, not equal. Some alliances have the potential to create more value for firms than other alliances, which suggests that these alliances are particularly attractive and therefore will be entered first. Chung et al. (2000) argued that firms are more likely to form alliances if they possess complementary resources and capabilities, and they found that resource complementarities among investment banks increased the likelihood they would underwrite securities together. Gulati (1995) argued similarly that firms from different industry niches typically have complementary resources, and he found that manufacturing firms from different niches were indeed more likely to form alliances than were firms from the same niche. Neither study attempts to model how firms sequence their alliance activity over time, but the fact that firms are most likely to enter the alliances that hold most potential value also suggests that firms should be more willing to enter into these alliances before they enter into less attractive alliances. When the density of alliances within an industry increases, the likelihood of finding attractive alliance partners within that industry that have not exhausted their alliance capacity decreases. When firms form alliances in periods of low density, they are simply more likely to have the opportunity to form their most preferred alliances, whereas when firms form alliances in periods of high density, they are less likely to have the opportunity to form their most preferred alliances.
Alliances between firms are typically exclusive relationships that prevent competitors from forming similar alliances with the same partners (GomesCasseres, 1994) . Alliances formed in periods where few other alliances have been formed are also more likely to foreclose alliance opportunities that otherwise would be available to competitors. Some research suggests that firms form preemptive alliances and that alliance preemption affects competition within an industry. Gomes-Casseres (1996) reported that partner scarcity and uncertainty about future technological standards in the computer industry encouraged firms to form preemptive alliances to secure their first choices of partners and avoid being left out of important technological developments. Silverman and Baum (2002) argued that preemptive alliances give firms a relative advantage by increasing competitive pressures on other firms, and they found that Canadian biotechnology firms were as a consequence more likely to exit the industry as the number of alliances in which their competitors participated increased. The preemption argument also implies that firms that form many alliances in periods where few other alliances have been formed not only are more likely to exclude other firms from individual alliances but also to monopolize central positions within the alliance network, thus giving them better access to and control over resource flows within the network (Gulati, 1999) . Alliances formed in periods of low alliance density therefore have stronger effects on future performance because they are more likely to be with attractive alliance partners and more likely to foreclose other firms' access to these attractive partners, thus suggesting that these alliances are particularly effective market signals.
While alliance announcements are effective market signals when alliance density is low and more attractive alliance partners are available, they may also be effective market signals when alliance density is high because more resources are available in dense alliance networks. The amount of economic and social resources that is available through networks depends primarily on the number of firms within an industry that participate in the network: more resources are available in networks with more firms than in networks with fewer firms. Moreover, as the firms already participating in the network form more alliances with different firms, the network becomes more connected and its resources therefore more widely accessible. Stuart (1998) found that the semiconductor firms occupying crowded parts of technology networks were more likely to form new alliances because they had access to more potential partners than the firms in less crowded parts of the network. Firms in crowded networks have access to more potential partners but the increased propensity to actually form alliances suggests also that alliances in crowded networks are particularly valuable. Gulati (1999) found similarly that network density increased the likelihood of alliance formation in three manufacturing industries, which again suggests that it is more attractive to ally when more alliances have been formed within a given population of firms. Although Gulati (1999) suggested that density-induced alliances reflect that it is easier for firms to mimic other firms' strategies when several firms pursue the same strategies, I suggest density-induced alliances also reflect that the value of participating in alliance networks increases as more firms form alliances and participate in the network. In other words, as more firms within an industry participate in the alliance network and as each firm participates in more alliances, the network not only becomes the repository and conduit of more information and resources, it also becomes easier to access information and resources throughout the network .
The potential negative consequences of not forming alliances and participating in the alliance network, however, are higher in periods where many alliances have been formed and alliances therefore have become an important or even dominant way of organizing interfirm collaborations and resource flows. Since firms with more and better resources are in higher demand as alliance partners (Gulati, 1998) , firms that fail to form alliances when many other alliances have been formed are not only excluded from resources and information residing in the alliance network, they may also be viewed as possessing less valuable resources and capabilities themselves. The potential negative consequences of not forming alliances are likely to be more severe in dynamic industries with rapidly changing technologies because only few firms in these industries have the necessary resources and capabilities to keep up with various technological advances and commercialize them on their own (Hagedoorn, 1993) . Since firms use alliances to develop, manufacture, and market new products in competition with other firms, alliances often come in waves as firms seek to mobilize their own alliance partners and beat other firms to the market. Gomes-Casseres (1996) describes how firms in the PDA (personal digital assistant) industry formed competing alliance groups (clusters of alliances) to develop, manufacture, and market the PDA. A direct consequence of the formation of competing alliance groups was an increased density of alliances with the PDA industry, thus suggesting that increased alliance density is an indicator of the intensity of innovative efforts within an industry , observed similar relationships in the biotechnology industry). To the extent that the density of alliances within an industry is positively correlated with innovative efforts within that industry, forming alliances in periods of high alliance density provides an indicator that firms are active participants in developing, manufacturing, and marketing new products.
These arguments suggest that the relationship between alliance announcements and future performance may be particularly strong in periods of either low or high alliance density: more alliance opportunities are available in periods of low alliance density and it is easier to foreclose attractive alliances, whereas more resources are available in the alliance network in periods of high alliance density and the economic and social costs of not participating in alliances are relatively higher. The following hypothesis is suggested on this basis:
Alliance announcements increase analyst coverage more when alliance density is low and when it is high than when it is medium.
Methods
Empirical context and sample. The empirical context is computer technology, defined here in terms of the computer equipment (SIC 357), the semiconductor (SIC 367), and the software and computer services (SIC 737) industries, from 1990 to 2002. Computer technology is an appropriate empirical setting in which to examine the relationship between alliance announcements and analyst coverage because of the widespread use of alliances within these industries to respond to technological developments and convergence (Hagedoorn, 1993; Greenstein and Khanna, 1997) . To obtain a comprehensive sample of the dominant computer technology firms, I sampled all the firms that were among the 100 largest (by sales) publicly traded (in the US) firms in each of the three industries in 1990, 1996, or 2002 . These firms were then followed from 1990 (1996) to 2002 or traced back to 1990 from 2002 (1996) and included in the sample for all the years from 1990 to 2002. This approach produced a base sample of 519 firms, of which 398 were in operation for at least two years from 1990 to 2002 and had full information on all variables available, resulting in 2896 observations (firm-years). The firms that dropped out of the final sample were almost exclusively smaller firms.
Dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable is the amount of security analyst coverage a firm receives each year, measured here by the number of analysts that issued earnings forecasts or investment recommendations about a given firm in a given year. It made little sense to distinguish between positive and negative coverage because analysts traditionally have been extremely reluctant to provide negative coverage (sell recommendations accounted for less than 5 percent of all recommendations in 1996 - Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001 ). Most analysts would rather drop coverage of firms they have lost confidence in than issue sell recommendations that could jeopardize relationships with the poorly performing firm (McNichols and O'Brien, 1997) . Data on analyst coverage were obtained from I/B/E/S.
The main independent variable is the number of alliances a firm announced in a particular year. This measure is a relatively direct indicator of the extent to which other firms demand focal firms' resources and capabilities: the more alliance announcements, the more demand. While alliances differ in intensity, ranging from closely intertwined equity joint ventures to less involved licensing agreements (Gulati, 1995) , it is practically impossible to determine the exact nature of each alliance in large-scale longitudinal research because it would require first-hand knowledge about each alliance. I therefore decided not to distinguish between alliances and simply counted each alliance announcement as a unique event. Since treating all alliances the same increases the ambiguousness of alliance announcements as market signals, it actually biases against detecting a relationship between alliances and coverage, thus representing a conservative approach. To reduce some of the heterogeneity in alliances, I focus on the alliances among the 519 computer technology firms in my sample. Data on strategic alliances were obtained from SDC Platinum (by Thompson Financial).
I used the multiplicative interaction approach (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003) to test the argument that the strength of the relationship between alliance announcements and analyst coverage depends on the density of alliances. The
density of alliances is defined by the total number of alliances announced in the last three years (divided by 100 in the analyses). Since alliance terminations typically are not made public, it is impossible to know exactly when a particular alliance is terminated. It is also unlikely that alliances endure throughout the entire period, however, and I therefore decided to define alliance density within computer technology in terms of the alliance announcements made in the last three years (aggregating alliance announcements over five years did not change the results). Using density periods of three years, a considerable number of the announced alliances have been dissolved again (Kogut, 1989) and the ongoing alliances have moved beyond the initial intensive period following announcement in which considerable resources are used to implement the new alliance. Since I argue that alliance announcements affect analyst coverage most at high and low levels of alliance density, I interacted alliance announcements with alliance density and alliance density squared. The density of alliances is graphed in Figure 1 . Control variables. Previous studies of security analyst coverage have shown that large, growing, and profitable firms are more likely to be covered by security analysts (e.g. Bhushan, 1989; McNichols and O'Brien, 1997) . I controlled for firm size by including a measure of firm sales and of firm growth by including measures of the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t . Firm profitability was measured both in terms of total shareholders' return, defined as the increase in market capitalization plus dividends from year t-1 to year t divided by market capitalization in year t-1 , and in terms of return on assets (ROA), defined as net income divided by total assets. Given the focus on computer technology, another measure of future growth potential is research and development (R&D)
J E N S E N : W H O G E T S WA L L S T R E E T ' S AT T E N T I O N ?
3 0 1
Figure 1
Density of alliances based on three-year periods intensity, which was defined as the ratio of R&D expense to sales. Since R&D expense was not reported for a minority of firms, I set these firms' R&D expense to zero and entered a separate binary variable to control for missing R&D data. Analysts may prefer to cover focused firms than diversified firms because it is more difficult to evaluate diversified firms that participate in several different industries (Zuckerman, 2000) . I therefore controlled for diversification by including a measure of the number of different industry segments in which firms participated. Whereas most computer technology firms were traded on NASDAQ, a significant number of firms were traded on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and a small number of firms were either traded on American Stock Exchange (AMEX) or traded over-the-counter. I used NASDAQ as the reference group and entered three binary variables (NYSE, AMEX, and overthe-counter) to control for stock exchange. Some industries may be more attractive to follow than other industries because they experience higher growth and profitability rates. I therefore controlled for industry by including two binary variables indicating whether firms' main activities were in the computer equipment or the semiconductor industry (the software and computer services industry was the reference group).
An important assumption behind the alliance density argument is that the number of firms within an industry remains constant over time, which is rarely the case as the number of firms typically increases and decreases over time as firms enter and exit an industry. Although I only focus on the largest firms in the computer technology industry, the number of firms still varied over time, as some firms sampled in 1990 (1996) exited the industry before 2002 and some firms sampled in 2002 (1996) had not entered the industry in 1990. More specifically, the total number of firms varied from 300 in 1990, to 398 in 1996, to 322 in 2002, which suggests a considerable circulation of firms in the computer technology industry. The variation is important because the moderating effect of alliance density ultimately depends on the number of firms within an industry that are available to form alliances. The alliance capacity of industries with more firms is higher than the alliance capacity of industries with fewer firms, thus suggesting that it is necessary to control for the number of firms within an industry when examining the moderating effect of alliance density. I therefore added a control for the number of firms that were based in the same industry as the focal firm (controlling for the total number of firms in computer technology provided similar results).
Another assumption behind the alliance density argument is that temporal variation in alliance density does not change the signaling implications of alliance announcements. The implication of low alliance density early in the period and late in the period (see Figure 1) is only the same if low alliance density means the same in these two periods. Density dependence theory in population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) has been criticized on the grounds that early low density reflects the emergence of new firms, whereas late low density reflects the concentration of established firms, thus suggesting that the
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meaning of low density is different in the two periods (Baum, 1995) . Although low alliance density in the early period may be partly explained by alliances being a relatively novel cooperation mechanism in 1990, it is unlikely that low alliance density in the late period is caused by increased concentration of firms because more firms actually existed in the later period than in the earlier period. The possibility that low density in the early and late periods has different meanings and therefore different signaling implications for analysts nevertheless still exists. I therefore followed Baum (1995) and controlled for temporal variation in density by including an alliance density by year interaction to adjust for the effects of alliance density in the early period and an alliance density by year squared interaction to adjust for the effects of alliance density in the later period. I/B/E/S provides information about coverage of more than 7000 analysts representing more than 1000 institutions. Although it is most likely that failure by a firm to be included in I/B/E/S means that no analysts were covering that particular firm (and therefore have been assigned the value zero in these analyses), the possibility still exists that a firm actually had obtained coverage not registered by I/B/E/S. I therefore included a binary variable to control for firms that, based on I/B/E/S, were inferred not to have obtained any analyst coverage in a particular year. Similarly, while SDC Platinum has been widely used in alliance research, some firms may still have been ignored and their alliances not registered in the database. I therefore also included a binary variable to control for firms that, based on SDC Platinum, were inferred not to have announced any alliances in a particular year. Finally, I controlled for year by including a continuous year variable. Table 1 presents summary statistics and correlations for the key variables (binary year variables are not reported here).
Statistical analyses. Since analyst coverage is defined in terms of the number of analysts that cover a firm in a particular year, negative binomial regression would be appropriate to test if alliance announcements affect the likelihood of analyst coverage (Guo, 1996; Rock et al., 2001 ). However, negative binomial regression is not suited to model changes in analyst coverage because the negative binomial distribution ranges from zero to positive infinity, thus disallowing modeling increases and decreases in coverage simultaneously. Although it is possible to model increases and decreases separately, it would force adding observations with neither increases nor decreases arbitrarily to the observations with increases or decreases or to include them in both sets of analyses, thus overemphasizing these observations. Since it is necessary to allow for both increases and decreases in analyst coverage in the same models I took the natural logarithm (plus one) of analyst coverage and used semilog regression to measure the constant growth rate of analyst coverage as a function of alliance announcements (Gujarati, 1995) . The estimated coefficients should therefore be interpreted as the constant proportional change in analyst coverage for a given absolute change in the underlying variables. The hypotheses suggest that alliance announcements increase analyst coverage at a decreasing rate. I therefore used a reciprocal specification of alliance announcements, dividing one by the number of alliance announcements (plus one). In analyses not reported here, I also used negative binomial regression to estimate the relationship between the likelihood of coverage and number of alliance announcements and found the results were similar to the semilog results reported here.
The final data structure is a pooled time series, where each firm contributes an observation for each year in the time series, which suggests that observations are not independent and that unobserved heterogeneity may therefore be a problem. The two most common approaches to addressing problems of unobserved heterogeneity are to insert additional firm-specific error terms that are either fixed over time for each firm (fixed-effects models) or vary randomly over time for each firm (random-effects models) (Sayrs, 1989) . I used random-effects models because time-invariant covariates cannot be estimated with fixed-effects models because they are indistinguishable from the fixed effects (Judge et al., 1985) . All the industry and stock exchange control variables were time-invariant and would have been excluded in the fixed-effects models. I nevertheless reestimated the models (without the time-invariant variables) using the fixed-effects approach and found that the results were similar to the randomeffects results (only the full fixed-effects model is reported here). Table 2 presents the results of regression analyses of analyst coverage. The main independent variables were entered one at a time as a precaution against multicollinearity and to make sure that the interaction variables improve model fit (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003) . Model 5 is a fixed-effects model used to show that the results are robust to the use of random-effects or fixed-effects. All the models provide support for Hypothesis 1, which suggested alliance announcements increase analyst coverage at a decreasing rate: the alliance announcements variable is consistently negative and significant (a negative coefficient in a reciprocal specification implies a positive relationship between the dependent and independent variables). Hypothesis 2, which suggested that the effect of alliance announcements is strongest when alliance density is high or low, is also supported. Since the alliance-density interaction in Model 4 is positive and significant and the alliance-density-squared interaction is negative and significant, the effect of alliance announcements is strongest when alliance density is high or low. Figure 2 illustrates the predicted relationship within the observed values of alliance density and alliance announcements between alliance announcements and analyst coverage for a hypothetical software firm of average sales and return on assets whose stocks were traded on NASDAQ in 1990. Reading Figure 2 from south to north shows that analyst coverage increases at a decreasing rate as firms announce more alliances, and reading from east to west shows that the effect of alliance announcements is strongest at low or high levels of alliance density (the increase is steeper and reaches a higher level of coverage than at medium density). Figure 2 also suggests that although alliance announcements are more effective at low or high density than at medium density, they are, within the observed range of densities, slightly more effective at low density than at high density. The control variables show unsurprisingly that larger, more profitable software firms traded on the NYSE received more analyst coverage than did smaller, less profitable semiconductor firms traded over-the-counter. The interactions of alliance announcements and alliance density and alliance density squared were not affected by the interactions of alliance density and year and year squared. The significant positive density-year interaction and the significant negative density-squared-year interaction suggest instead that the effect of alliance den-
Results
Figure 2 The interaction of alliance announcements and alliance density sity itself changes from being U-shaped in most of the sample period to being almost linearly decreasing in the last years (interactions between alliance announcements, alliance density, and year or alliance announcements and year were not significant).
Discussion and conclusion
This study adopts the perspective that strategic alliances not only are mechanisms for resource exchanges but also constitute important market signals that influence how security analysts perceive firms. I argue specifically that alliance announcements increase analyst coverage because alliances represent a strong form of external endorsement and typically increase the value of the resources and capabilities firms possess. The results provide strong support for this argument. They show that the amount of analyst coverage firms obtained increased at a decreasing rate as firms announced more alliances. I also argue that alliance announcements are particularly effective as market signals when the density of alliances is low because more attractive alliance opportunities are available or when the density of alliances is high because more resources are available. The results also provide strong support for this argument. They show that analyst coverage increased more as a function of alliance announcements when alliance density was either low or high than when it was medium, but also that alliance announcements seemed to be slightly more effective market signals when alliance density was low. These results have important consequences for research on strategic alliances and security analysts. First, this study bridges research on strategic alliances and security analysts by showing that alliance announcements affect analyst coverage, thus suggesting that alliances formed to facilitate resource exchanges between firms also have important unintended consequences for their access to security analysts and ultimately potential investors. This study suggests that the scope of alliance consequences have been specified too narrowly in prior alliance research and that it is important to define the potential consequences of alliances more broadly in order fully to appreciate the importance of alliances. Similarly, research on analyst coverage has also focused too narrowly on traditional indicators of future performance, such as firms' size and performance, and has neglected to examine how the attractiveness of firms as alliance partners provides a unique signal of future performance. By focusing explicitly on the relationship between alliance announcements and analyst coverage, this study also provides further insight into the well-established positive stock market reaction to alliance announcements. For example, Anand and Khanna (2000) argued that the positive relationship between the number of alliances firms have announced and abnormal stock returns surrounding alliance announcements shows that firms learn to create value in alliances through experience. However, this study suggests that the relationship between cumulative alliance announcements and abnormal
stock returns may be at least partly accounted for by the increased attention obtained from security analysts by firms that announce many alliances Second, this study also contributes more broadly to research on alliancebased market signals. While prior research has shown that alliance-based market signals are most important in situations where firms are surrounded by high levels of uncertainty (Stuart et al., 1999) , this study shows that the effectiveness of market signals themselves (independent of their application) depends on the broader context in which they are used. This finding is important because it suggests that the implicit assumption behind cross-sectional research that the importance of alliance-based market signals is constant over time cannot be upheld and that alliances therefore should be studied over time. Specifically, this study suggests that the effectiveness of alliance-based market signals, regardless of individual firm attributes, depends on the density of alliances surrounding the use of the market signal. It is therefore difficult to evaluate the true effect of alliance-based market signals in research that has implicitly assumed that their signaling value remains constant regardless of the context in which they are used and differs only as a function of the degree of uncertainty surrounding the firms to which they are applied.
A potential limitation of this study (and all other research on analyst coverage) is that the use of strategic alliances as market signals is inferred and not examined directly through interviews or surveys of security analysts. However, it is highly problematic to perform retrospective longitudinal interviews or surveys due to availability and self-serving biases in reconstructing own past behaviors (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Klein and Kunda, 1993) . To make sure that analysts actually pay attention to alliance announcements, I searched the Investext Plus database, which contains full-text research reports dating back to 1996 from more than 500 analysts, to find evidence that analysts react to alliance announcements. The research reports suggested that analysts do attend to strategic alliances, as evidenced by reports focusing both on the specific alliance between firms and on the patterns of alliances in entire industries. Nevertheless, it might still be informative to explore in more detail exactly how analysts use alliance announcements as market signals.
Future research might also explore further the possibility that different types of alliance partners may have different values for different firms. For example, by shifting the unit of analysis from the firm to the dyad, future research might examine whether the market signal effect is stronger for a small firm that allies with a large firm than for either a large firm that allies with a small firm or a small firm that allies with another small firm. Indeed, the gross effect of alliance announcements on analyst coverage may not be equally distributed between the different parties to an alliance, thus suggesting that firms may actively seek out specific alliance partners to enhance their visibility. This study focused on the computer technology industry because of the frequent use of alliances within this industry. The dynamic nature of the computer technology industry makes it more difficult to evaluate the future performance of firms, thus increasing the 'altercentric uncertainty' confronting analysts when they have to decide what firms to cover (Podolny, 2001) . Further research should therefore test the generalizability of the theoretical model presented here by focusing on the effectiveness of alliance announcements as market signals in more stable industries characterized by less altercentric uncertainty.
In conclusion, this study makes several contributions to research on alliances as market signals. First, it complements prior research on alliances as market signals and extends it to the domain of security analysts by showing that strategic alliances affect analyst coverage. Second, new ground is broken by shifting attention from how firm-level contingency factors affect the importance of alliance-based market signals to how market-level contingency factors affect their importance. Finally, by examining the contingent relationship between alliance announcements and analyst coverage, this study also represents a first step in examining the positive spillovers between the different social systems, such as alliance networks and stock markets, in which firms participate.
